A list of recent hot projects on layer2 and layer2 updates to projects
Vote of the Gods
Gitcoin’s big move
A list of the most recent projects on layer2 and the projects that have made layer2 updates to their projects
Celer Network: is the layer2 extension platform that brings fast, secure and low-cost blockchain applications on Ether, Polkadot and other blockchains to the mass market. celer launched the world’s first universal stateful channel network and continues to push the boundaries of layer2 extensions with advanced rollup technology. frontier.
Orbiter: Layer2’s decentralized transfer protocol across rollups supports direct transfers between rollups with only one contract and can be completed in one block time, without the 7-day wait time and without consuming ETH mainnet gas fees.
Loopring: Loopring protocol uses zero-knowledge proof technology, allowing developers to build high-throughput, low-cost, non-custodial, order-based decentralized trading platforms on Ether.
Polygon: is a protocol and framework for building and connecting Ethernet-compatible blockchain networks. Aggregates scalable solutions on Ether to support a multi-chain Ether ecosystem.
zkSync: is the scaling and privacy engine for Ether. Its current scope of functionality includes low-cost trading of Ether (ETH) and ERC20 tokens in the Ethernet network.
Metis: is an open framework built on a Layer 2 protocol for the creation, management and development of decentralized, self-organizing corporate DACs.
Argent: It is the most secure and simple way to access the next generation of the Internet, the decentralized and distributed network.
dYdX: It is the world’s first decentralized digital currency derivatives trading platform
Gnosis: A decentralized prediction marketplace built on the Ethernet protocol that provides an open platform for people to predict the outcome of any event, greatly simplifying the process of creating custom prediction market applications.
V Vote of God
Voting is a process that requires a great deal of process integrity. The result of the vote must be correct, and there must be a transparent process to ensure this, so that everyone can trust that the result is correct. There should be no successful attempts to interfere with anyone’s vote or prevent their ballot from being counted.
Blockchain is a technology that provides guarantees for the integrity of the process. If a process runs on a blockchain, it is guaranteed that the process will run according to some pre-agreed code and provide the correct output. No one can stop the execution, no one can tamper with the execution, and no one can censor and prevent any user input from being processed.
So at first glance, the blockchain seems to provide what is needed for voting. I’m not the only one who thinks this way; many major potential users are interested in it. But it turns out that some people have a very different opinion ….
Bad blockchain voting protocols
Blockchain voting protocols are always hacked. Two years ago, blockchain voting technology company Voatz was all the rage, and many people were very excited about it. But last year, some researchers at MIT discovered a series of critical security flaws in their platform. Meanwhile, in Moscow, a blockchain voting system about to be used for an election was hacked, fortunately, a month before the election was to begin.
The hack was quite serious. Here is a table analyzing the attack capabilities that Watts’ researchers managed to discover :
This in itself is not an argument against the use of blockchain voting. But some argue that blockchain voting software should be designed more carefully and scaled up gradually over time.
Privacy and resistance to coercion
But even blockchain voting protocols that are not technically broken are usually pretty bad. To understand why, we need to look more deeply at what specific security properties blockchains offer and what specific security properties voting requires – and when we do, we will see a mismatch.
Blockchains provide two key attributes: proper execution and resistance to censorship. Correct execution simply means that the blockchain is subject to the user’s inputs (“transactions”), processes them correctly according to some predefined rules, and returns the correct output (or adjusts the “state” of the blockchain in the right way). Boycotting censorship is also easy to understand: any user who wants to send a transaction and is willing to pay a high enough fee can send it and expect it to be included in the chain soon.
These two properties are very important for voting : the output of the user who wants to vote is actually actually counting the number of votes for each candidate and selecting the candidate with the most votes, and we definitely want people to be able to have the eligibility to vote for elections. But voting also requires some key attributes that blockchain does not provide :
Privacy: users should not know who a particular candidate voted for, or even if they voted at all
Anti-coercion: users should not have to prove to others how they voted, even if they want to say so
The need for the first requirement is obvious: users want people to vote based on their personal feelings, not on how the people around them, their employers, the police, or random people on the street feel about their choices. Preventing “selling the vote” requires a second condition: if users can prove how they voted, it becomes very easy to sell your vote. Voting provability would also enable forms of coercion in which the coercer demands to see some sort of proof of voting for his or her preferred candidate. Most people, even those who are aware of the first requirement, will not consider the second. But the second requirement is also necessary, and providing it is technically nontrivial.
Secure e-voting without blockchain
The concept of securely executing social mechanisms in a cryptographic manner was not invented by blockchain geeks, but actually existed long before. Outside of the blockchain space, cryptographers have a 20-year tradition of working on the problem of secure e-voting, and the good news is that there is a solution. Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson’s 2002 paper entitled “Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections” has been cited in the literature for the past 20 years:
Since then, the concept has gone through many iterations; Civitas is a prominent example, although there are many others. These protocols all use a similar set of core technologies. There are recognized “talliers,” and there is an assumption of trust that most talliers are honest. Each tallier has a “share” of the private key – shared between them – and publishes the corresponding public key. Voters post ballots encrypted to the counters’ public keys, and the counters decrypt and verify the ballots and count the votes using a secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol. Counting is done internally at MPC: talliers do not get to know their keys, and they compute the final result without knowing anything about individual votes, except what they can learn from the final result itself.
Encrypted voting provides privacy protection, and some additional infrastructure, such as a hybrid net is added on top to make the privacy stronger. To provide anti-coercion, one of two techniques is used. One option is that during the registration phase (where the public key of each registered voter is known), the voter generates or receives a key. The corresponding public key is shared among the talliers, and the MPC of the talliers counts as a vote only if it is signed with the key. Voters have no way to prove to a third party what their key is, so if they are bribed or coerced, they can simply show and vote a ballot signed with the wrong key. Or, the voter could send a message to change their secret key. The voter has no way to prove to a third party that they did not send such a message, leading to the same result.
The second option is a technique where voters can vote multiple times and the second vote can overwhelm the first vote. If a voter is bribed or coerced, they can vote for the candidate preferred by the bribed / coerced person, but then cast another ballot to override the first.
Giving voters the ability to vote at a later date can override a previous vote, which has been the key coercive boycott mechanism of the protocol since 2015.
Now, let’s look at an important nuance in these protocols. They all rely on an external protolanguage to complete their security guarantees: the bulletin board (this is the “BB” in the image above). A bulletin board is a place where any voter can send a message and guarantee that : (1) anyone can read the board, and (2) anyone can send a message to the accepted board. Most of the voting documents you can find against coercion casually mention the existence of bulletin boards. “As is common in e-voting schemes, we assume a publicly accessible bulletin board with only additional information”), but few papers discuss how this bulletin board would actually be implemented. Here, one can see my intention : the most secure way to implement a bulletin board is to use an existing blockchain !
Secure electronic voting using blockchain
Of course, there have been many attempts to make a bulletin board before blockchain. this paper from 2008 is one such attempt: its trust model is a standard requirement that “k out of n servers must be honest” (k = n/2 is common). This literature review from 2021 covers some of the previous attempts to use blockchain on bulletin boards, as well as exploring the use of blockchain at work; previous blockchain solutions have also relied on the k-of-n trust model.
Blockchain is also a k-of-n trust model; it requires that at least half of the miners or verifiers of interest follow the protocol, and if this assumption fails, it usually results in a “51% attack”. So, why is a blockchain better than a special-purpose bulletin board? The answer is that building a truly trusted k-of-n system is difficult, and blockchain is the only system that has solved this problem at scale.
On the other hand, public blockchains have a permissionless economic consensus mechanism (proof of work or proof of interest) that anyone can participate in, and they have an existing diverse and highly incentivized infrastructure of blockchain browsers, exchanges, and other watch nodes to constantly verify that nothing bad is happening in real time.
These more sophisticated voting systems do not just use the blockchain; they rely on cryptography such as zero-knowledge proofs to guarantee correctness and on multi-party computation to guarantee resistance to coercion. Thus, they avoid the weaknesses of more naive systems by simply “putting the vote directly on the blockchain” and ignoring the resulting privacy and coercion-resistance issues. However, the blockchain bulletin board remains a key part of the overall security model design: if the committee is broken, but the blockchain is not, anti-coercion disappears, but all the other guarantees around the voting process remain in place.
MACI: Coercion Resistant Blockchain Voting in Ether
The Ethernet ecosystem is currently experimenting with a system called MACI that combines a blockchain, ZK-SNARKs and a single central participant to guarantee anti-coercion (but without any ability to break any property other than anti-coercion).MACI is not technically very difficult. Users can participate by : signing the message with their private key, encrypting the signed message to the public key published by the central server, and publishing the encrypted signed message to the blockchain. The server downloads the messages from the blockchain, decrypts them, processes them, and outputs the results with ZK-SNARK to ensure that they were computed correctly.
Users cannot prove how they are involved because they have the ability to send a “key change” message to fool anyone who tries to audit them: they can first send a key change message, changing their key from A to B, and then send a “fake message” signed with A. “fake message” signed by A. The server will reject the message, but no one else has any way of knowing that the key change message was ever sent. There is a need for trust on the server, albeit only for privacy and anti-coercion; the server cannot issue incorrect results by incorrectly computing or censoring messages. In the long run, multi-party computation can be used to somewhat decentralize the server and strengthen privacy and coercion-resistance guarantees.
A working demo of this solution is available at clr.fund. Funding for secondary funding. The use of the ethereum blockchain to ensure censorship resistance for voting ensures a much higher likelihood of censorship resistance than relying on a committee to do so.
But is the technology trustworthy ?
But now we return to a second, deeper critique of electronic voting of any kind, blockchain or not: the technology itself is too insecure to be trusted.
A recent paper from MIT criticizing blockchain voting includes this useful table describing how any form of paperless voting is fundamentally too difficult to secure :
The key property the authors focus on is software independence, which they define as “the property that undetected changes or bugs in the system software cannot lead to undetected changes in the election results.
But there are other ways to deal with bugs; for example, any blockchain-based voting system that uses publicly verifiable zero-knowledge proofs can be independently verified. Someone could write their own proof verifier implementation and verify Zk-SNARK themselves. they could even write their own voting software. Of course, the technical complexity of actually doing this exceeds 99.99% of any actual voter base, but if thousands of independent experts are capable of doing it and verifying that it works, that’s good enough in practice.
However, for the MIT authors, that’s not enough :
Therefore, any system that uses only electronics, even if it is end-to-end verifiable, does not appear to be suitable for political elections in the foreseeable future. The American Vote Foundation has noted the promise of the E2E-V approach to improving online voting security, but has issued a detailed report recommending avoiding its use for online voting unless and until the technology is more mature and fully tested in voting .
Others have proposed extensions to these ideas. For example, Juels et al.’s  proposal emphasizes the use of cryptography to provide multiple forms of “anti-coercion.” The Civitas proposal by Clarkson et al.  implements additional mechanisms for anti-coercion, which Iovino et al.  further incorporate and refine into the Selene system. and refined into the Selene system. From our perspective, these proposals are innovative but unrealistic: they are quite complex and, most seriously, their security relies on the unrealistic assumption that the voter’s equipment is not compromised and functions as expected.
The authors’ concern is not whether the hardware of the voting system is secure: the risk in this regard can actually be mitigated without proof of knowledge. Instead, the authors are concerned with a different security question : is the user’s device secure even in principle ?
Given the long history of various exploits and hacks on consumer devices, one could reasonably argue that the answer is “no”. To quote my own 2013 article on Bitcoin wallet security :
Last night around 9pm, I clicked on a link to CoinChat[.] freetzi[.] . com – prompting me to run java. I did (thinking it was a legitimate chat room), but nothing happened. I closed the window and didn’t think about it. I opened my bitcoin qt wallet about 14 minutes later and saw a transaction that I hadn’t approved for my wallet going to wallet 1Es3QVvKN1qA2p6me7jLCVMZpQXVXWPNTC…
In June 2011, Bitcointalk member allinvain lost 25,000 Bitcoins (then worth $500,000) when his computer was directly compromised by an unknown intruder. The attackers were able to access allinvain’s wallet.dat file and quickly emptied the wallet – either by sending transactions from allinvain’s computer itself, or by uploading the wallet.dat file and then emptying it on their own computer.
But these disasters obscure a larger fact: Computer security has actually been improving slowly but steadily over the past two decades. Attacks are harder to detect and often require attackers to look for vulnerabilities in multiple subsystems rather than a single vulnerability in a large piece of complex code. The incidents under the spotlight feel bigger than ever, but that doesn’t mean that anything is getting more secure. Rather, it’s just a sign that we’re becoming increasingly dependent on the Internet.
Trusted hardware is a very important source of improvement these days. Some of the new “blockchain phones” (for example. This phone from HTC) go quite far in this technology and install a minimalist security-focused operating system on a trusted hardware chip, allowing applications that require high security (e.g. cryptocurrency wallets) to be separated from other applications. Samsung has already started producing phones that use similar technology. Even devices that have never been advertised as “blockchain devices”. Even devices that are never advertised as “blockchain devices” (such as the iPhone) often have some type of trusted hardware. A cryptocurrency hardware wallet is effectively the same thing, except that the trusted hardware module is physically located outside the computer rather than inside. Trusted hardware often gets a bad rap in security circles, especially in the blockchain community, because it keeps getting broken over and over again. Indeed, we certainly don’t want to replace our own security protections with it. But as an enhancement, it’s a huge step forward.
Finally, single applications, such as cryptocurrency wallets and voting systems, are much simpler and have less room for error than entire consumer operating systems – even if you have to merge support for secondary voting, sorting, secondary sorting, and all the horrors of next-generation Glen Weyl invented tools in 2040 . The beauty of tools like Trusted Hardware is that they isolate the simple from the complex and potentially corrupt, and these tools are having some success.
So over time, the risk may decrease. But what are the benefits ?
These improvements in security technology bode well for a future where consumer hardware may be trusted more than it is today. The investments made in this area over the past few years are likely to continue to pay off in the next decade, and we can expect further significant improvements. But what are the benefits of making voting electronic (blockchain-based or otherwise) ?
My answer is simple: voting will become more efficient, allowing us to vote more often. Currently, formal democratic input into organizations (government or corporate) is often limited to one vote every 1-6 years. This effectively means that each voter puts less than a little into the system each year. Perhaps in large part for this reason, decentralized decision-making in our society is largely divided between two extremes: pure democracy and pure markets. Democracy is either very inefficient or very insecure (social media likes / retweets). Markets are technically much more efficient and secure than social media, but their underlying economic logic makes them inapplicable to many types of decision-making problems, especially those related to public goods.
We could do a lot if we could create more systems that fall somewhere between democracy and markets, benefiting from the egalitarianism of the former, the technical efficiency of the latter, and the economic properties of both. Secondary financing is a good example. Fluid democracy is another good example. Even if we don’t introduce novel proxy mechanisms or secondary mathematics, we can do a lot by voting more and by adapting the information available to each voter on a much smaller scale. But the challenge with all these ideas is that to have a plan that can sustainably maintain any plan , at a democratic level, requires some form of witch revolt and mitigation of the right to buy: which is exactly what these fancy ZK-SNARK + MPC + blockchain voting schemes are trying to solve.
Crypto spaces can help
One of the underrated benefits of crypto spaces is that they are an excellent “virtual SEZ” for testing economic and crypto ideas in a highly adversarial environment. Once the economic power it controls exceeds a certain size, regardless of what content is built and published, a variety of sometimes altruistic, sometimes profit-motivated, and sometimes malicious actors (many of them completely anonymous) will appear on the system and try to redirect this economic power to their various goals.
The attacker’s motivation is quite sufficient: if an attacker steals $100 from a user’s crypto-economic tool, they usually get the full $100 reward, and they usually get away with it. But the motivation for defenders is also quite sufficient: if someone develops a tool that helps users avoid losing money, they can (at least sometimes) turn it into a tool and make millions of dollars. Cryptocurrency is the ultimate training ground: if you can build something that can survive on a large scale in this environment, then it may also survive in the larger world.
This applies to secondary funding, to multi-signature and social recovery wallets, and to voting systems. The blockchain space has helped drive the rise of important security technologies :
Efficient universal zero-knowledge proofs
Formal verification tools
“Blockchain phones” with trusted hardware chips
Anti-witch solutions, such as proof of humanity
In all of these cases, some version of the technology existed before the blockchain existed. But it is hard to deny that blockchain has had a significant impact in driving these efforts, and that the incentives inherent in the field have played a key role in raising the stakes for technology development.
In the short term, any form of blockchain voting should be limited to small experiments, whether for more mainstream applications or small experiments in the blockchain space itself. The current security is clearly not good enough to rely on computers for everything. But it is improving, and if I’m wrong and security doesn’t improve, then not only blockchain voting, but cryptocurrencies as a whole will struggle to succeed. So there is a lot of incentive for this technology to continue to improve.
We should all continue to look at these technologies and the efforts being made around the world to improve security and slowly become more comfortable using technology in very important social processes. Technology is already key to our financial markets, and encrypting a large portion of the economy (or even just replacing gold) will put a much larger portion of the economy in the hands of our encryption algorithms and the hardware to run them. We should watch and support this process carefully, and leverage its benefits over time to bring our governance technology into the 21st century.
Gitcoin’s Big Move
Now to introduce the GTC token and GitcoinDAO – two key components that allow Gitcoin to be decentralized and create a fair protocol for funding open source development.
What is Gitcoin ?
Open source software is the foundation for coordinated tools that help humanity solve its toughest challenges. However, despite an annual economic output of over $500 billion, developers have traditionally had no way to pay rent when working on open source projects.
Gitcoin is a platform that provides funding for developers looking for meaningful open source work. They pioneered the “secondary fund,” a novel and democratic way to fund public goods in quarterly Gitcoin Grants. Since its launch in November 2017, Gitcoin Grants has funded nearly $16 million in public products. Meanwhile, open source developers from around the world have received $3.54 million in prizes.
Gitcoin has received a huge boost due to the growth of the cryptocurrency industry as a whole. Bitcoin, ethereum and hundreds of open source crypto projects ended up with funding built into their protocols. This has brought billions of dollars into the open source ecosystem for the first time in the history of the internet. gitcoin believes this has huge implications, many of which have yet to be explored.
While this growth is huge, Gitcoin needs to evolve as web3 evolves. Today, Gitcoin allocates millions of dollars to thousands of public product projects. Tomorrow, Gitcoin will distribute billions of dollars, and for that to happen, Gitcoin needs to remain reliably neutral.
Governing the Gitcoin DAO
The DAO is the vehicle through which Gitcoin carries out its mission. It consists of community members who coordinate the funding of public products, and introduces Gitcoin tokens (GTC) to determine where to allocate resources.
The GTC is a reliable governance token for neutral developer talent and public product funding, and is a means of gradually decentralizing the Gitcoin platform through the Gitcoin DAO.
Initially, the Gitcoin DAO will oversee the community vault of GTC tokens and provide a governance framework for representatives (called Gitcoin stewards) to participate in key ecosystem decisions such as funding allocation, matching pools, and licensing complicity.
GTC is an offshoot of the COMP/UNI governance system, with a delegate prompt built into the retroactive claims process.
The goal is to gradually introduce a more formal framework for ongoing Gitcoin development and maintenance, and to manage it through on-chain voting.
Gitcoin tokens (GTC) are distributed to active participants in Gitcoin tasks.
GTC has no economic value: it is a governance token used to oversee the Gitcoin ecosystem. It has no financial claims.
The total supply of GTC is 100 million tokens, broken down as follows.
Retroactive Airdrop – 15%
Gitcoin DAO – 50%
Existing Stakeholders – 35%
The purpose of this distribution is to divide the GTC equally between past and future contributors. 50% to those who have created Gitcoin so far (retroactive + stakeholders) and 50% to future builders.
Retroactive Airdrop – 15,000,000 GTC (15%)
15% of the GTC supply is allocated retroactively to past Gitcoin users.
This allocation is broken down as follows :
ALLOCATION TYPEALLOCATION%TOKENCOUNTGMV (50/50)72%10,080,000On-Platform Actions20.4%3,060,000KERNEL1.6%240,000Funders League6% 900,000Total100%15,000,000
(2% cap on all users in each allocation group)
GMV – short for Gross Market Value – describes any action that moves value through Gitcoin. This includes rewards, tips, hackathons, and grants. GMV is split evenly (50/50) between consumers and gainers, meaning that people who earn money from Gitcoin are allocated a bucket of GTC, and people who spend money (e.g., by contributing to Grant) are allocated another bucket.
The following users can do this on the platform.
open a bounty
Sends a job to a bounty
Opened a grant
Donated a grant
This part of the distribution (user activity) contains a decay, which means that actions performed early in the Gitcoin lifecycle carry more weight.
A portion of the tokens are reserved for KERNEL members and are allocated based on interactions and participation in Block I and Block II.
Projects participating in the Funder Consortium are allocated a share of GTC. This is calculated by apportioning the total donation to the funder alliance match pool and issuing GTC on a pro-rata basis.
Users will be asked to claim their tokens through Quadratic Lands, and since this is their first time using GTC, users will be asked to entrust their tokens to themselves or one of the Gitcoin administrators.
Gitcoin DAO – 50,000,000 GTC (50%)
Half of the GTC supply will be deposited into a time-locked contract held in the Gitcoin DAO library and managed directly through on-chain GTC voting.
The GTC allocated to the Gitcoin DAO will be distributed in equal monthly installments over the next 2 years, meaning the full allocation will be unlocked by May 25, 2023.
Gitcoin will utilize Compound’s governance framework branch, which means that all proposals will have a minimum proposal threshold of 1%, a quorum of 2.5%, and will require a 51% majority to pass.
Simply put, this means that in order to propose a vote on the chain, the proposer must hold at least 1% of the GTC tokens. In order for the vote to pass, at least 2.5% of the GTC supply must vote on the proposal and vote 51% in favor of the winning decision.
Stakeholders – 35,000,000,000 GTC (35%)
The remaining Gitcoin was allocated to Gitcoin Holdings’ stakeholders.
This includes allocations to the Gitcoin team, investors, future employees, and strategic partners. Anyone who has contributed to building Gitcoin between 2017 and 2021 is included in this allocation. This includes the core team that created the product, brand, and marketplace, as well as investors who provided $5 million (2017-2021) and $11.3 million (2021 and beyond) in investments to the core team.
All GTCs assigned to Gitcoin team members must adhere to a minimum two-year vesting schedule. All GTCs assigned to existing Gitcoin stakeholders are non-transferable for a minimum of 500 days, or longer if the Gitcoin Board of Directors determines that a longer period of time is necessary to comply with regulatory or other applicable restrictions.
Gitcoin’s ultimate goal is to create what it calls “Quadratic Lands” – a digital ecosystem ruled by digital democracy, with generous funding for public goods. In Quadratic Lands, Gitcoin hopes to rewrite the rules of economic gravity and envisions creating upward economic mobility for thousands of builders. Most importantly, Quadratic Lands is built by the communities it serves – creating a positive feedback loop that allows everyday citizens to improve the digital communities they live in.
While the Gitcoin DAO is an end in itself, it is also a means to another end: charting a course to the “Quadratic Lands” – a future state where communities have the right to build for the common good and rule digitally. A future nation where communities have the right to build for the common good and rule in a digital democracy.
Quadratic Lands represents a destination where.
There are many opportunities to create financial sovereignty while working side-by-side with people who share similar values.
Individuals have the sovereignty to make their own choices, but the incentives are there to collaborate to generate personal and community benefits.
Economic infrastructure is a set of economic games with transparent rules that cannot be changed without the consent of the community.
The surface area of opportunity grows exponentially as tools are stacked on top of each other.
Why create a Gitcoin DAO?
“We are faced with the task of aligning money with the true expression of our gifts. — Charles Eisenstein
The consent of the governed is the only legitimate basis for governance. gitcoin has chosen to devolve the governance of the platform to a DAO, which will fully empower the community to govern itself.
Now that products like Gitcoin Grants have become cornerstones of the ethereum funding ecosystem, it is extremely important that its ongoing development is managed directly by and for the Gitcoin community.
The launch of Gitcoin DAO is the first step in Gitcoin’s continued growth. As the amount of money allocated to digital public goods grows from millions to billions of dollars each year, this process must be done in tandem with the community actually contributing to these public goods. gitcoin wants and needs the community’s involvement to ensure that these funds are allocated in line with our shared goals.
Over the next few months, Gitcoin hopes that GTC introduces new ways to influence sybil resistance, grant management, democratize open source fund distribution, and create upward mobility for talented builders. For those who aspire to play an active role in the future.
Posted by:CoinYuppie，Reprinted with attribution to:https://coinyuppie.com/layer2-hot-projects-collection-which-will-become-the-next-breakout-point/
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