DAO’s prehistory co-op, game guild and upcoming network

The year is 1996. John Perry Barlow is about to announce that “the Internet is made up of transactions, relationships, and ideas themselves”

From the perspective of today’s networks, one might argue that only the first part of Barlow’s statement is correct. The spectacle surrounding digital assets shows that we have reached a new level of financialization, continuing the trajectory of our more online behaviors becoming direct economic interactions. Although blockchain-based digital assets are suitable for speculative financial markets, they are not the only application of the technology. During the peak of this hype cycle, we can see the relationships established by the new peer-to-peer institutions take root below.

Computers in the early world? The Ruzname-i dairevi astronomical watch is suitable for the Arebi (Islamic) and Rumi (Julian) calendars, and provides an explanation of the chronological sequence of the changes of the seasons, the sun entering the zodiac, and the time of summer and sunset. Picture: Wellcome Series

One of the first core applications of public blockchains is global digital assets. In a sense, they do not rely on institutions to prove that they have not been double-spent and are global: the mysterious cat NFT on the moon is the only mysterious cat on the moon NFT corresponding to its token. The utility of provable uniqueness also extends to types of relationships beyond direct economic exchange, which has led many people to think equally about new forms of finance and new forms of organization.

However, the prospect of new organizational forms assisted by information technology is inseparable from the background of the invention of the Internet. In 1995, a year before John Perry Barlow published the “Declaration of Independence in Cyberspace,” another written work that would influence the political ideology of the early Internet appeared: David Rofer “Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks” (TIMN) by David Ronfeldt. The TIMN report was funded by RAND Corporation.

In Dr. Strangelove, it was taunted as BLAND Corporation, a non-profit R&D think tank founded in 1948, responsible for providing information to the US military, government, and industry to this day. Because the Internet started in this militarized environment, we will also start from here.

The Times Report has created a narrative of social evolution in which humans have made progress through four different forms of organization:


(T) The principle of social organization in which tribes have kinship, clan and descent. 

(1) The institution has a social organization principle of a hierarchical system. (M) The social organization principle of competitive exchange in the market. (N) The network has the social organization principle of layered collaborative exchange. Hierarchy here means that the organization is unranked, unranked, or has the ability to rank in multiple ways.

Although the new form of organization has evolved over time, the previous form of organization “grows within the scope of its activities, even if the scope is newly restricted”, citing how the market increases taxation to support the institutional state, despite restrictions in other respects To participate in direct economic exchanges.


The report’s institutional biases are obvious, such as equating progress with Western liberal democracy, and its narrative of social evolution may seem reductive at best. However, its arguments provide a historical background for the political ideologies that decentralized organizations have consciously or unintentionally drawn from. This is most evident in the report’s recognition of the latest organizational form: the Internet.

The report is somewhat open to the definition of network. A key distinguishing feature between the network and their previous organizational forms is that the network is described as multi-organized, emphasizing collaboration between distant “small, decentralized, and autonomous” groups. These groups do not necessarily share a unique organizational unity.

Although the Internet has always existed in history, new information technology emphasizes partnerships that have a huge impact on institutions across jurisdictions and markets, “promoting the development of keiretsus and other distributed, network-like global enterprises, as well as Vietnam. There are more and more so-called “virtual companies,” Ronfeldt pointed out. However, the main domain of multi-organization networks is neither the public nor the private sector, at least traditionally.

On the contrary, they will most change the third “autonomous social sector”, which is identified as civil society in the report. In the 1995 organizational map, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), grassroots organizations, and private voluntary organizations, civil society will be strengthened through multi-organizational networks and may address the accessibility surrounding inequality, bureaucracy, and failure of previous organizational forms Sexual issues.

The report presents the sweet political image of the network: “Although the development of institutions and market organizations has led to an emphasis on competitive advantages, the development of multi-organization networks may shift the focus to cooperative advantages.” Behind this political performance is the imperial soft power that NGOs will export to the world in the next ten years. For those currently working on web3, all these languages ​​may find it familiar, although this suspicious ideological inheritance is often overlooked.

Since the report finally emphasized the three-letter acronyms of civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, NPOs, and PCOs, there is naturally no future one: DAO.

Mosaic terms:

DAO stands for Decentralized Autonomous Organization.

DAO stems from the imagination of how decentralized technology features (such as global digital assets, censorship resistance, and automated operations) will change the way organizations operate. Originally called Decentralized Autonomous Company (DAC), the more general term DAO appeared in the Ethereum blockchain community. Based on Vitalik Buterin ‘s DAO, DAC, DA, etc.: 2014 incomplete terminology guide, DAO can be described as a capitalized organization in which a software protocol informs its operations, placing automation at its center and humans at the edge. For example, a software agreement can specify the conditions under which an organization automatically allocates funds to its members. This leads to the idea that organizational value can be automated and executed by code. This lingering idea may incorrectly imply that tacit knowledge can be fully expressed in software protocols. Although there are many hypothetical ideas about the term, when DAO changed from theory to experiment, the community largely redefined the term DAO to mean “unstoppable” or censorship-resistant businesses. The first DAO named The DAO became one of the biggest spectacles of the Ethereum blockchain community so far in 2016. It raised more than $150 million in ETH as a decentralized venture fund in 2016 . However, when The DAO was hacked a month after its release, the experiment proved to be short-lived.

It was not until a few years later that large-scale projects related to the DAO received attention again. Since then, DAO has deviated from its original purpose and continues to be a chimeric term, the term and its realization vary according to its cultural background. Every speculative activity in the market, despite the noise, creates a new signal that the DAO can deploy, bringing descriptive, technical and cultural improvements to concepts in practice. Although some people joked that a group sharing the lunch bill may be a DAO, in order to avoid over-generalization (9), the DAO will be restricted here to focus on examples in the Ethereum blockchain community, although other communities are similar Coordination is also very important. By 2021, the DAO can be described as a voluntary association that conforms to the operating principles of digital corporatism. As voluntary associations, they are cross-jurisdictional ways in which strangers, friends, or unlikely allies gather anonymously to achieve common goals, and are supported by token models, incentives, and governance. The members of the DAO can have representative ownership of their digital assets through tokens, which usually act as governance rights at the same time.

Although many DAOs will not accept the label of digital cooperation, it can be said that DAOs treat corporatism as an agreement, which means that a set of evolving relationship practices are different from traditional corporate structures or decentralized autonomous companies because they prioritize Member ownership. The label cooperative is further restricted by digitization here, because today the DAO is mainly coordinated around digital assets. However, as the DAO concept develops in practice, its digital dominance will gradually fade. As we will see, DAO also introduces new dimensions that are beyond the conceptual scope of the operational principles of digital cooperation.


The decentralized technology ecosystem tends to describe a phenomenon through its technology products. However, as Ruth Catlow, the co-founder of Furtherfield and DECAL Decentralized Art Lab, pointed out, “we need to build culture first, then structure” (10). Although the following overview of DAO tools provides a specific description of the concepts in practice, it is important to remember that DAO ultimately coordinate through a collective atmosphere.


In its simplest form, DAO tools are described as group chats and bank accounts (11). In 2021, this usually takes the form of Discord servers and Gnosis Safe Multisig, which is the web3 platform used to create multi-signature accounts. Multi-signature accounts allow anonymous groups across jurisdictions to pool and manage funds in minutes, with capabilities far beyond traditional joint bank accounts. This “minimum viable” DAO or MVD tool will shine in the first half of 2021 through initiatives such as PleasrDAO.

PleasrDAO is a collective bidding artist pppleasr’s NFT. In view of the rising prices of NFT digital art auctions, the idea behind PleasrDAO is simple: a group of fans using multi-signature accounts can pool funds to bid, and compete with other major bidders to win the auction through joint holdings. After winning their first auction of the same name, PleasrDAO continued to collect other works, such as Stay Free, an NFT supported by independent media charity by Edward Snowden, with a total of 22,000 ETH or the equivalent of US$5.4 million. Their repeated and successful missions mean that while still acting as collectors, PleasrDAO will expand their scope and start incubating projects by their community. Initiatives like PleasrDAO are the most promising to challenge institutional collectors by expanding membership, inviting them to collect artists like pleasr to become members of the collective in turn.


Although group chats and multi-signature accounts may be sufficient to initiate DAO tasks, tokens are often the next step in embracing the principles of digital cooperation. For example, PleasrDAO has issued $PEEPS, which is an internally distributed token used to represent members’ rights and interests in the collection, and they are considering making it public to subdivide the ownership of their collection. Similar experiments, such as PartyDAO, use tokens. The $PARTY token represents the joint ownership of group chat members, governance rights, and production value managed by the DAO. It is important to note that PleasrDAO and PartyDAO are not flat hierarchies, as they both elect a group of individuals to manage their multi-signature account vaults. Although PleasrDAO and PartyDAO initially focused on shorter tasks, they are both moving towards a longer-term vision, as collectors, investors, and incubators, using tokens to represent co-ownership in the spirit of digital cooperation. Tokenization creates opportunities and challenges for the upcoming network.

The new dimension of cooperative movement:

Back to their origins, today’s DAOs are similar to DAOs. They emphasize open participation and economic value creation, while their culture shifts more to specific niches and social connections. In the above example, there is a term that is deliberately ambiguous: governance. Today, many DAOs use the lightweight Snapshot platform for governance (13). On Snapshot, each DAO has a space to create and vote on proposals. For example, PleasrDAO and PartyDAO both have a Snapshot space, where they face collective decisions for public voting. Snapshot weights are voted based on the number of DAO specific tokens held by the address, such as the $PEEPS token in PleasrDAO.


The topic of governance has its own history in the crypto ecosystem and will not be elaborated here. It is worth noting that the MolochDAO initiative, which uses the classic font Papyrus and heavily quotes the game guild, reignited the flame of decentralized governance after The DAO hackers. MolochDAO continues to inspire a large number of new DAOs, many of which are directly forked.


The history of DAO in this article is far from complete, because other projects such as Aragon, Colony, DAOhaus, and DAOstack continue to develop platforms for DAO, and modular projects such as Block Science and Commons Stack have emerged.

These projects provide DAO tools that support many governance mechanisms. However, without the frequently mentioned relationship with platform cooperativism, the prehistory of DAO is also incomplete.

Building on decades of public initiatives, the term “platform cooperativism” coined by Trebor Scholz and the concept of “exiting the community” outlined by Nathan Schneider have intersected the crypto space through articles such as Jesse Walden’s “Economy of Ownership”.


These slogans promote platforms that are owned, developed, and managed by the user community. Specifically, the concept of “withdrawing from the community” has affected decentralized governance by clearly articulating the third way of company development ownership.

Through initiatives such as DXdao, exit the community to grow in practice, which aims to give the software protocol community ownership, governance and value.

Nowadays, as many decentralized financial software protocols guide their development through DAO, it is clear that software protocols can either withdraw from the community or be built together with the community. Because DAO uses early software tools, their first users and use cases will involve the governance of digital assets, such as software protocols, which makes sense. The digital primacy of DAOs may be one of the reasons why their similarities to earlier cooperative movements are often overlooked.

Today, the International Cooperative Union defines a cooperative as an “autonomous association of people who voluntarily join together to satisfy their common economic, social and cultural needs and desires through jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprises” (14). A cooperative can also be defined by the structure of its legal entity, which means that a cooperative is not owned by shareholders, but a company owned by its members. A key moment in the history of the cooperative was the establishment of the Rochdale Principles, which were formulated in 1844 by a weavers association. The International Cooperative Alliance has adopted these operating principles, which still guide global cooperatives:

1. Voluntary and public membership

2. Democratic member control

3. Member economic participation

4. Autonomy and independence

5. Education, training and information

6. Cooperation between cooperatives

7. Follow the community

Although these operating principles have evolved over the past two centuries, today’s DAO can easily formulate them. The principles of voluntary and open membership, economic participation of members, and community attention are translated into the above DAO examples. Autonomy and independence and the principle of cooperation between cooperatives are the key to the prosperity of DAO as a multi-organization network, strengthening autonomous social sectors through cross-DAO cooperation.

DAO can formulate more thoughtful norms around democratic membership control. Cooperatives usually define it as one member and one vote. Most DAOs use token voting, that is, one token, one vote. DAO believes that token ownership represents stakeholders, and the token model is usually directly related to the DAO economically, for example, by charging for the software agreement it owns.

This allows DAO members with greater financial interests to have proportionally greater influence. Token voting does not directly contradict the principle of cooperation, because there are some cooperatives that weight votes based on quality such as production. In some cases, this may feel appropriate, but as some DAOs move toward maintaining basic infrastructure, this inequality becomes undesirable. This is partly because not all stakeholders have the purchasing power to represent their interests, and their practical knowledge may be excluded from governance.

Projects such as the Tornado Cash privacy agreement solve this distribution problem by sending tokens retrospectively to previous users, so that users become stakeholders of the agreement (16). The Regen Network project is a public blockchain for ecosystem services, which uses another method to solve this distribution problem. They reserve 30% of the tokens to land administrators, climate scientists and other stakeholders in renewable land management to form a community DAO that participates in network governance. Since tokens are easier to distribute than traditional corporate interests, memberships or shares, this creates the possibility for a new form of token holding company, which can be more integrated into governance without increasing operating transaction costs. In-depth practical knowledge. Stakeholders with practical knowledge or “tacit” knowledge, such as land administrators in the Regen Network, benefit governance by incorporating informal practices into decision-making. Here, DAO begins to introduce new dimensions that go beyond the concepts contained in the operating principles of digital cooperation.

Therefore, as with the decision-making mechanism, the token distribution mechanism should be innovated and emphasized as much as possible to identify the participation of a wider range of stakeholders.

The tokenization of online communities may be a subject of long-term debate. Far from the best answer to the social media dilemma of Web 2.0, tokenization introduces more financial relationships. As a guiding light, the goal of the web3 application is to introduce value in historically rejected relationships, such as labor and the environment, rather than creating new financialized relationships. In this context, for the DAO whose mission is to create economic value, tokens become a useful mechanism in three aspects:

1. Start-up capital

2. Distribution of governance rights

3. Align DAO’s ecosystem

Tokenization introduced a strong cultural norm for early organizations: the expectation of transparent co-ownership of assets from the beginning. The tension between the more traditional corporate structure that pays dividends and the DAO still exists (17). Because most DAOs use tokens to represent governance rights, in a sense, tokens directly introduce the Trojan horse principle of cooperatives into a highly financialized space. Literally, these are two important aspects of a coin, so tokenization should not be ignored. Tokens may be a key to unlock the ownership economy, but in order to achieve a fairer future version, we must now participate in cultural construction around token distribution, mediation, and governance. This becomes important because, unlike shares in cooperatives, many tokens with governance rights can be sold on the secondary market. Although this makes the conditions for entering the organization easier, the DAO can learn from the cooperative’s emphasis on long-termism, and build more cultural models through more experimental mechanisms around token ownership, limited transferability or more.

Just as DAO can learn from case studies of cooperatives, in two-way exchanges, DAO can introduce more forms of decentralized governance into cooperatives. This is the case presented by Morshed Mannan in Using Blockchain Technology to Cultivate Workers’ Cooperatives: Experiences and Lessons from the Colony Project, which cited how cooperatives often face “coordination issues as entities expand across national borders”, “participatory management and mutual supervision” The negative trend of “and solidarity” because of their internationalization. The dilemmas faced by cooperatives, such as funding, governance, and cross-jurisdictional coordination, are directly addressed by the DAO. They treat corporatism as an agreement rather than a corporate structure. Among the new words, DAO can encourage a cultural space that can transcend traditional sectors.

The Gilded Age:

Although DAOs may accidentally accept the operating principles of previous cooperatives, they are also cunningly similar to enclaves from other online cultures. In a massively multiplayer online game (MMO), they can learn the most from the guild.


With the launch of role-playing computer games in the 1990s, this meant that a large number of players could share a game world: an environment with multiple goals, activities, and secondary plots. Early overall examples of MMO include The Realm Online, Ultima Online, and EverQuest, which led to more classic games such as World of Warcraft and EVE Online. In many of these examples, most players can freely set their own goals under the loose guidance of the open game world narrative, enlightenment and risk (18), and because of this narrative freedom, players form groups to complete unreachable common Target single player game. These groups are widely known as guilds, clans, or alliances. The number of participants ranges from 40 to 1,000. Their goals may include defeating difficult enemies or building useful tools.

In order to achieve these goals, cultural patterns will appear in the guild, and sometimes the tools released by the game world developers for the guild do not match their actual needs. In an example of EVE Online, the developer of the game world created an interface for players to create a company that allows players to allocate shares. In practice, this function of allocating shares is rarely used because it does not enhance the existing cultural model. Instead, using EVE Online’s in-game browser and data API, many guilds have developed their own tools to achieve their goals. The similarities between game guilds and DAO can be drawn here, because the current DAO wave tends to use a combination of combinable tools, such as connecting the Snapshot voting platform to the Gnosis Safe multi-signature account, rather than over-expected use of the platform Participant’s case.


Although the specific function of allocating company shares may not have emerged in EVE Online, game guilds often adopt the economic approach of redistribution. MMO market, from Varrock to gold farming, the great importance of decentralized finance will be the subject of a later article, but an economic practice may be closely related to DAO: Dragon Killing Point (DKP).

Historically, when dragons were the most frequently encountered enemy in MMOs, DKP was named after them and appeared as a distribution system within and sometimes across guilds.

The complex, continuous missions performed by the guild, such as killing a dragon, are usually called raids, ranging in length from a few hours to a few days. At the end of the raid, the killed enemy will drop an in-game item called loot, and the guild must decide how to distribute it.

Because guilds need a diverse and complementary combination of player skills over a long period of time, “it is important to get the same people to work together again”, and the perceived fairness of the usually scarce loot distribution is critical to this. As the guild matures, they usually evolve different loot distribution systems, such as starting from random distribution, and gradually shifting to random distribution based on participation weights, and they are usually distributed through informal scoring systems (such as DKP). As a private currency system, DKP is separate from any existing currency in the game world, and guild members earn them based on their participation in raids. Guild members can choose to spend these points in exchange for loot after the raid.

DKP was originally designed by a guild in 1999 for the EverQuest MMO. Despite slight adjustments, it has been accepted by many guilds in many game worlds. Ed Castranova and Joshua Fairfield detailed an example in Dragon Kill Points: A Summary Whitepaper: the Leftovers DKP system, which maximizes the number of participants by not being tied to a specific guild. As Castellanova and Fairfield wrote, “In fact, this organization is actually the highest distribution agency in the population. If there is an emergency government in the hands of [World of Warcraft] Silver, it is leftovers. Leftovers.” The leftovers DKP system has some limitations: loot can only be picked up after the battle is over, and cannot be transferred between players in World of Warcraft. The Leftover DKP system has a small group of informally appointed managers: players laboriously set up and maintain the loot price database in DKP through open dialogue. When the loot is dropped, players with DKP can choose to use them for specific items, and all bids and transactions are public. As a zero sum, the Leftovers DKP system then evenly distributes the spent DKP points to all other guild members participating in the raid.

As pointed out by Castranova and Fairfield, DKP supplements the existing currency of the game world, both for effective distribution and for social cohesion, “making it possible to exchange goods (obtained) for time (spent in raids where individuals are not compensated) . In the raids where the individuals won the spoils)”.

Especially in World of Warcraft, because the loot cannot be transferred between players, the loot itself also has a strong signal function, indicating that the player has meaningfully participated in the raid over time. This DKP system precedes the mechanisms of the DAO platform currently being developed, such as Aragon, Colony, and DAOstack. They all provide mechanisms for distributing reputation tokens based on the participation of members, and provide rewards for successful proposals, bounties or activities: what could be It is called raid in other game worlds. These reputation tokens complement other economic systems supported by the DAO platform, such as DAO-specific tokens or other assets in the multi-signature account library. It is usually used as an alternative model for the single token of the rich, the one-vote model, and the reputation token. It is obtained through participation rather than purchasing power, and provides greater voting power in the DAO accumulated over time. DAO can learn from DKP. On the contrary, DKP acts as a private currency system based on participation, which can be used for other digital assets instead of just accumulating over time.

In addition to effective distribution, contextual reputation, and signaling functions, the DKP system has another meaning for DAO: usually all guilds resolve disputes independently of the traditional court system, even though these disputes involve expensive equity. This is highly related to DAO tools, such as Aragon’s digital jurisdiction or Kleros’s decentralized arbitration service, which are designed to provide Internet-native dispute resolution tools. In fact, DAO tools often try to technically solve problems that game guilds have been culturally refined for decades. Now may be the time for DAO and game guilds to more closely integrate their practical knowledge.


Another subtle cultural model of the game guild is related to its clear economic structure. As researcher Joshua Citarella pointed out, many DKP systems are similar to a form of market socialism, in which commodities are publicly owned but distributed by the market. Citarella also continued to point out that although the DKP system is similar to market socialism and the players participating in it are generally happy, many of them will never accept the label of market socialism politically. When a group operates through an economic form, shadow economics may be an appropriate term. It does not label itself as: DAO as a cooperative agreement and game guild as market socialism. This trend makes the political field as interesting as game guilds not fully explored, because game guilds usually do not need to wear their own flags. On the one hand, this may be more like a feature than a mistake, because the invention of new terms like DAO, rather than reliance on the norm, inspired their enthusiasm to a certain extent.


Although this may lead to neglect of their prehistoric history, the DAO still retains a strong ambiguity, in which their flourishing political ambitions have not yet been fully familiar with aesthetic expressions. This can be selected for several different purposes. For example, we can imagine a DAO. When the global temperature rises by more than 2 degrees Celsius, its treasury will destroy itself, just like the NFT of terra0, accompanied by a sparkling, humble mascot incarnation

Such a DAO may attract participation from those who are not attracted by the green aesthetics familiar to most climate initiatives, and it may expand participation in political goals by creating a new culture around it. The momentum of new things is always good for something, and the question becomes how to cultivate a DAO that can cross ideological differences and build secret solidarity.

The birth of a constellation:


Although the comprehensive prehistory of decentralized autonomous organizations can give us a deeper understanding of the past, many supporters of the DAO have a core belief in its impact on the future: DAO can overcome competition by cooperating with modern companies.

In the 20th century, many economists asked why companies appeared when market-priced services should theoretically be more efficient. Ronald Coase explored the answer to this question in The Nature of the Firm and concluded that the market creates unexplainable transaction costs. These transaction costs may come from price discovery, contract negotiation, or service entry, and these costs can be mitigated by retaining the service in the company. According to this theory, the size of the company may have practical limits, and they will not exceed it, because the final transaction cost will increase with the development of departmental bureaucracy. Although this theory has many criticisms, the promise of the DAO can be linked to it: DAO aspires to become more efficient as its scale expands (25). Although this desire is far from proven in practice, in some respects, the DAO’s commitment is to use technical governance agreements to reduce transaction costs. Going back to the example above, DAO tools like Gnosis Safe enable anonymous groups across jurisdictions to pool and manage funds in minutes. The equivalent process of establishing a traditional joint bank account may take several months. In some cases, it is impossible for individuals from different jurisdictions to jointly manage a bank account. Through the availability of public blockchains, DAOs can incorporate more in-depth practical knowledge into governance without increasing operational transaction costs: they desire to become more efficient as their scale expands.

Although DAO tools like Gnosis Safe achieve this today, overall, the promise of infinitely scalable organizations still has a long way to go. Often, even the promise of the DAO will obscure its utility in practice. In The Dissensus Protocol: Governing Differences in Online Peer Community, Jaya Klara Brekke, Kate Beecroft, and Francesca Pick focused on the case study of Genesis DAO, a collective centered on the DAOstack platform. They wrote:

The Genesis DAO is a good example of the unique characteristics shared by many DAOs, namely that they are composed of highly active groups that are formed around a set of ideas about governance, rather than treating governance as a way to achieve some common mission means. In other words, it is tool-centric and focuses on one main action: allocating funds for proposals. It is unusual for a stranger to start making financial decisions together immediately without time to build coherence and trust.

This is actually the promise of projects such as Genesis DAO: The technology will bypass the need to develop trust relationships, which means that thousands of people will be able to unite around goals, take action, and even spend money together as a group

Just like the earlier example of EVE Online players not using the interface to allocate company shares issued by game developers, the assumption that tool-centric development and tools automatically create useful cultural patterns must be reconsidered. Unlike governance technology agreements that reduce the need for trust relationships, DAO can be achieved by iteratively developing highly composable tools to coordinate between different levels of consistency and trust. In the final analysis, the efficiency pursued by the DAO may not be defined as an economic function, but a “better” governance issue: the support of deeper practical knowledge in the infinite game.

The level of DAO:

DAO will not be the unified non-hierarchical network that some people imagine. Instead, DAOs coordinate between different levels of consistency and trust. In terms of ownership in Cryptonetworks, Patrick Rawson believes that for DAO, “assigning ownership to squad-like entities with more professional goals is a key long-term problem that needs to be resolved” in order to achieve meaningful work. These “squad-like entities” are smaller teams with a trust relationship, and may not be different from the game guild in the above example, and they perform tasks with the same value as the DAO. On closer inspection, effective DAOs begin to behave more like team networks, such as the MONDRAGON Corporation network with 100 affiliated cooperatives, rather than the loosely coordinated swarm intelligence that they might emerge from a distance. Inspired by Rosen’s analysis, we can roughly outline the three layers of a DAO:


1. Token: a multi-organization network aligned by token ownership

2. Team: Teams, guilds, teams represented by token ownership

3. Missions: missions, milestones and raids funded by token ownership

From these layers, a hierarchical network emerges, which means an organization with the ability to rank in multiple ways.


An example of DAO where tokens, teams, and tasks are distributed across multiple DAO networks. These networks can be ranked or classified in a variety of ways.

In an ecosystem where ownership is prioritized, tokens encourage the DAO network to be managed by its members. Tokens, teams, and tasks are not limited to the quasi-institutional boundaries of a single DAO, but can and in order to meaningfully decentralize control of the network, and should be represented by the ownership of tokens in multiple DAOs. An ecosystem different from the control network of multinational companies has emerged, but the important thing is that the ecosystem does not have a single center of command, and it reduces transaction costs across different levels of trust. As Rosen wrote, “As long as collective memory circulates freely within a given [DAO network], the solutions to problems found can be reused.” When we think of DAO as a multi-organization network aligned by token ownership, The purpose of DAO tools is not only to support the operation of a team, but also to promote the collaboration of multiple teams. Funded by PrimeDAO, the DAO-to-DAO (D2D) collaboration mechanism seems to be the most forward-looking work in these areas, and may eventually surpass traditional business-to-business (B2B) products. The Gnosis Guild team is a new squad-like entity that emerged from the stealth mode. It also emphasizes DAO to DAO tools and uses a new set of DAO tools called Zodiac.

Re-examining the DAO’s commitment, their potential to incorporate deeper practical knowledge in governance does not mean that decisions must involve more and more members in each proposal, but in the DAO network, the one with the most relevant expertise The team can easily share with the ecosystem. When we see the DAO as the constellation of the team rather than as a single unit, the DAO becomes a network that allows collective memory to flow freely.

Upcoming network: 

TIME RAND reports that the article ended with a strange note. It wrote:

Much of the literature on redesigning organizations for the information age focuses on production—increasing productivity, or making new products like the Boeing 777 jetliner. However, isn’t this just a lingering industrial age mentality? Production organization is still an important part of organizational ecology. However, we should also consider “sensory organization”. Sensory functions are completely different from production functions and require different organizational models—for example, more networks are connected to the world outside the office. Determining suitable designs for various sensory organizations may become a good meta-theme for innovative research and development in the coming years.

This ending emotion echoes the popularity of the 20th century media theorist Marshall McLuhan in that era, who emphasized how digital media affects our sensory nervous system. If digital major networks like DAO operate on our nervous system first, this does not mean that they will not come to reorganize, reshape, and redistribute our physical world. Some people still refuse to take seriously the fact that cooperative principles, game guilds, and strange imaginations like DAO present an emerging form of organization with legitimate political relevance. We must now take them seriously politically, lest they are only affected by people on one side of the digital divide. The days of DAO and PAC (Political Action Committee to raise funds for American election candidates) will soon come. Just as the market did not make countries obsolete, but weakened some of their operations while strengthening others, the DAO introduced a new form of traditional political participation emerging from autonomous social sectors: cyber alliances.


In order to draw attention to the serious mistakes of the chimeric term, many people have returned to its misnomer: the “A” in the DAO does not conform to its autonomous reference; while others, such as researcher Aude Launay, elegantly invoked the word in the DAO The spirit of political rather than technological autonomy. Although the term DAO is still poetically correct, we can occasionally propose an alternative: a decentralized avatar organization. These organizations will despise and treat their political interests seriously. As the poet and Taiwan Minister of Digital Audrey Tang pointed out, the time to become a politician has arrived. Avatar politicians are virtual characters representing political platform representatives, gatherings and advocacy. When the degree of automation increases, they may even produce their own political platforms. A decentralized avatar organization will recognize the upcoming spirit of the virtual age: this may look like a collectively managed cyborg like Lil Miquela, or an entire environment shaped by members like the mobile castle of Trust. The decentralized virtual image organization will take collectively developed and interoperable game worlds, engines or virtual mascots as its core, and jointly create the culture surrounding its member organizations.

By learning from their prehistoric history, the DAO can turn to a convergent organizational theory, which means a theory that incorporates a wide range of cultural models, practices, and influences, while acknowledging its inherited political prejudices. In order to get rid of the obsession with governance technology agreements, decentralized avatar organizations must cultivate compelling environments where players want to live, recognizing that a common narrative, aesthetics, and goals are the keys to their success.

As Barlow wrote, it depends on the depth of these narratives that the Internet becomes not only a place for trading, but also a place for relationships and ideas themselves. As in the case of massively multiplayer online games, DAO is not a technical protocol for governance, but a higher risk game world that is intertwined.

Posted by:CoinYuppie,Reprinted with attribution to:https://coinyuppie.com/daos-prehistory-co-op-game-guild-and-upcoming-network/
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